I was terrified by the 1970 Kent State Massacre. I was the same age as the victims (20-21), shared the same anti-war politics and studied in the same university faculties. And mostly because my friends and I were going on anti-war demonstrations in Melbourne all through 1969 and 1970.
I have used contemporary newspapers for the 1970 reports (Kent State, Idea Stream and NY Times etc) and David Steigerwald for the 2020 retrospective analysis.
On Friday night 1st May, a ruckus at Kent State in NE Ohio surprised unprepared University officials. Local leaders insisted that outside agitators and radical elements, long presumed active in the campus area, were to blame. Kent's mayor declared a state of emergency in town and established a curfew. And he appealed to Ohio governor James Rhodes to send in the Ohio National Guard/ONG. Rhodes had deployed the Guard very often in other strikes. NB Gov Rhodes called on J. Edgar Hoover, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director, to look into the campus violence.
The guardsmen encircle the students and prepare to take aim
The ONG units arrived in Kent late Saturday night as fire gutted the campus ROTC building, a fire set by the students. The Guard moved on campus and pushed students from the central Commons back toward the dorms. The Guard’s commanders Gen Del Corso and Gen Canterbury made clear that they recognised no boundaries between town and campus, nor did they acknowledge university officials.
On Sunday 3rd May, Gov Rhodes stopped at Kent en route home. With Del Corso and other officials there, he delivered an inflammatory speech denouncing mysterious outside agitators who were running between universities, causing destruction. They were “worse than the Brownshirts and the communists. We are going to eradicate the problem.”
Del Corso believed that Rhodes approved whatever measures were necessary to eradicate the problem, including shooting to kill. Yet he also told University President Robert White not to close the university i.e unofficial martial law Vs a campus going about its normal affairs.
In part because of this contradictory situation, Monday 4th May ended in tragedy. Near noon, Canterbury led 100 Guardsmen on to the Commons to disperse 500 students who’d gathered. The Scranton Report on Campus Unrest found some students came to protest the presence of the Guard. Others were simply curious, or had free time. The Guardsmen were equipped with tear-gas launchers, gas masks and rifles loaded with live ammunition.
The Guard moved toward the students after firing tear-gas volleys. But it was a windy day, and the gas blew with the wind. So the Guard pushed most students up Blanket Hill and down the other side toward a football field. The Guard with gas masks on and loaded rifles ready, marched into the field. Students with their notebooks wandered past peers who were hurling tear-gas canisters back at the Guard. Some chucked rocks; others jeered. Many students described the atmosphere as carnival-like; few imagined that the Guard’s rifles carried live rounds.
After having pushed the students from the Commons, Gen. Canterbury decided to go back up Blanket Hill and return to the front of campus. As they turned to move, Guardsmen dropped to their knees & aimed their weapons. Canterbury’s men got to their feet and when they reached the top of the hill, they suddenly wheeled around and faced the crowd. 13 seconds later, 30 helmeted National Guard soldiers fired in unison at the students. Allison Krause 19, Jeffrey Miller 20, Sandra Scheuer 20 and William Schroeder 19 were killed and nine others were injured, Dean Kahler 20 suffering permanent spinal paralysis.
ONG leaders, especially Del Corso and Canterbury, rushed into self-justification. They stoked rumours that the Guardsmen feared for their lives and responded to sniper fire, although the FBI quickly debunked that story. The State’s legal process continued through a manipulated county grand jury, the 1973 federal indictments of 8 Guardsmen charged with violating the civil rights of those they shot and its grudging 1979 agreement to pay paltry civil damages to the victim’s families. Rhodes signed a letter of regret. But no guardsman, no commander, nor the Ohio governor who ordered them to occupy the campus and incited them, was ever brought to justice.
Bottom: William Schroeder, Sandra Scheuer
I have used contemporary newspapers for the 1970 reports (Kent State, Idea Stream and NY Times etc) and David Steigerwald for the 2020 retrospective analysis.
On Friday night 1st May, a ruckus at Kent State in NE Ohio surprised unprepared University officials. Local leaders insisted that outside agitators and radical elements, long presumed active in the campus area, were to blame. Kent's mayor declared a state of emergency in town and established a curfew. And he appealed to Ohio governor James Rhodes to send in the Ohio National Guard/ONG. Rhodes had deployed the Guard very often in other strikes. NB Gov Rhodes called on J. Edgar Hoover, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director, to look into the campus violence.
The guardsmen encircle the students and prepare to take aim
The ONG units arrived in Kent late Saturday night as fire gutted the campus ROTC building, a fire set by the students. The Guard moved on campus and pushed students from the central Commons back toward the dorms. The Guard’s commanders Gen Del Corso and Gen Canterbury made clear that they recognised no boundaries between town and campus, nor did they acknowledge university officials.
On Sunday 3rd May, Gov Rhodes stopped at Kent en route home. With Del Corso and other officials there, he delivered an inflammatory speech denouncing mysterious outside agitators who were running between universities, causing destruction. They were “worse than the Brownshirts and the communists. We are going to eradicate the problem.”
Del Corso believed that Rhodes approved whatever measures were necessary to eradicate the problem, including shooting to kill. Yet he also told University President Robert White not to close the university i.e unofficial martial law Vs a campus going about its normal affairs.
In part because of this contradictory situation, Monday 4th May ended in tragedy. Near noon, Canterbury led 100 Guardsmen on to the Commons to disperse 500 students who’d gathered. The Scranton Report on Campus Unrest found some students came to protest the presence of the Guard. Others were simply curious, or had free time. The Guardsmen were equipped with tear-gas launchers, gas masks and rifles loaded with live ammunition.
The Guard moved toward the students after firing tear-gas volleys. But it was a windy day, and the gas blew with the wind. So the Guard pushed most students up Blanket Hill and down the other side toward a football field. The Guard with gas masks on and loaded rifles ready, marched into the field. Students with their notebooks wandered past peers who were hurling tear-gas canisters back at the Guard. Some chucked rocks; others jeered. Many students described the atmosphere as carnival-like; few imagined that the Guard’s rifles carried live rounds.
After having pushed the students from the Commons, Gen. Canterbury decided to go back up Blanket Hill and return to the front of campus. As they turned to move, Guardsmen dropped to their knees & aimed their weapons. Canterbury’s men got to their feet and when they reached the top of the hill, they suddenly wheeled around and faced the crowd. 13 seconds later, 30 helmeted National Guard soldiers fired in unison at the students. Allison Krause 19, Jeffrey Miller 20, Sandra Scheuer 20 and William Schroeder 19 were killed and nine others were injured, Dean Kahler 20 suffering permanent spinal paralysis.
The most serious unresolved questions were whether an order to fire was given and by whom. Some men heard an order; and still others explained that they fired only because others did. If no order was given, then Canterbury and his officers failed to control their men. If the officers gave an order, then they were directly responsible for the killings. While Nixon did not give the order to fire, he helped create the political climate for the violence, degrading antiwar student protesters just before Kent State.
What has been learned since 1970? The massacre at Kent State showed that the U.S. military had launched a shooting war against their own children. It was an event that distilled the age of tumult: young pitted against old; opponents of American policy in Vietnam against the Cold War consensus; or the forces of change against the forces of order.
What has been learned since 1970? The massacre at Kent State showed that the U.S. military had launched a shooting war against their own children. It was an event that distilled the age of tumult: young pitted against old; opponents of American policy in Vietnam against the Cold War consensus; or the forces of change against the forces of order.
In May 1970, initially peaceful protests against President Richard Nixon’s announcement about expanding the Vietnam War into neutral Cambodia morphed into state-sponsored killing. Hundreds of college campuses closed as protests erupted. Young people were testing boundaries, challenging restrictions and engaging in political protest. Even worse, the Kent State killings happened in the very heart of middle America, in “politically and culturally inert” Kent State. The counterculture, anti-war movement and Black Power had arrived, and America was imploding.
Memorial photos for the massacred students, 1970
Top: Allison Krause, Jeffrey MillerBottom: William Schroeder, Sandra Scheuer
This month Kent State commemorated 50 years since the massacre with a candlelight vigil and a radio play.